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After Marabar: Reading Forster, Robbe-Grillet, Spark 
Joseph Hynes 
Fifty years ago E. M. Forster set forth the basis for interesting and valuable dis 
tinctions when, in A Passage to India, he attached importance to the terms 
"muddle" and 
"mystery." Both within and well beyond the context of that novel, 
as I hope to indicate, these terms can be seen to stress what the receiver and 
potential "connector" makes experience to mean, rather than what an object, per 
son, occurrence may mean in some absolute sense. Forster's distinction is also, 
then, relativistic: one man's muddle is another man's mystery. Moreover, the dis 
tinction emphasizes, relativistically, at least two ways of regarding the unknown 
or the rationally unexplainable: those of one kind of rationalist and of the super 
naturalist, or perhaps those of realist and romantic. 
Forster's book and its distinguishing terms are attractive because, albeit nega 
tively, they remind me again of what seems a non-problem or at any rate a not 
very pressing or interesting problem, and also because, positively, they intimate 
how to take the initial premises of two kinds of author and therefore how to read 
two kinds of book. My intention, accordingly, is briefly to put aside (without 
disposing of) the non-problem, and then to look at two contemporary writers 
in Forster's terms if not with his eyes, in order to establish the two writers' dif 
ferences. To perform this dual task should remind us again of Forster's vision as 
well as clarify our reading of two authors whose books seem well suited to dis 
cussion stemming from Forster's terminology. The two writers of prose fiction 
are Alain Robbe-Grillet and Muriel Spark, and the not very interesting problem 
is the generic one. 
I 
To minimize generic differences here does not imply their lack of importance 
in the long view, or suggest that I am ungrateful for such terms as tragedy and 
comedy, epic and lyric, narrative and drama. Rather, while I suspect that generic 
refinements may eventually lead to fruitful insights into the two writers in ques 
tion, I maintain that such theoretical buttressing as we have been given to ex 
plain away the novel and to fashion in our minds the anti-novel or post-novel 
fiction seems unconvincing as support for something absolutely new, and radically 
unhelpful as means to reading what it is intended to elucidate. For my money, it 
is immensely more valuable to use labels like novel and novella to cover longer 
and shorter prose fiction, and to accommodate liberal humanistic psychology, 
post-modern anti-novelistic phenomenology, and other such nomenclature within 
the retained, maybe too simple, but eminently serviceable categories. 
If I am right in my readings and inclinations, then, the realm of the novel is 
very broad indeed, and not at all limited to nineteenth-century social and psycho 
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logical realism, whenever and wherever written. While I do not wish to linger 
over this point (which I should not have raised at all were it not so insistendy in 
the air that we have seen the end of the novel and its possibilities), I think I may 
clarify this issue by observing that I seem to read a good many more novels care 
fully, and without confusing their characteristics with those of other books, when 
I think of these books as varieties of "novel," than when I regard them as ex 
amples of Novel, Romance, Fantasy, Anti-Novel, etc. We have indeed to allow 
for such differences as are suggested by these capitalized headings, but I for one 
can make such allowances more readily within the realm of novel than by re 
garding, say, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Ulysses, Tom Jones, Bleak 
House, Tristram Shandy, Pale Fire and Watt as intrinsically distinct kinds of 
writing. For me, then, at least where prose fiction is concerned, generic distinc 
tions do not constitute a theoretical problem in criticism of the contemporaneous. 
II 
What may be called a problem is exacdy what has always been a problem: es 
tablishing the different conventions, suppositions, literary moves, all of them 
recognizably novelistic, which go into distinctions among texts. In other words, 
differences between Moll Flanders and Tristram Shandy are no more differences 
of kind than are differences between either of these novels and Robert Coover's 
Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry Waugh, Prop. All of these books 
are narratives, stories or occurrences told (if only by a voice or voices); all are 
prose; all are unified indications of morally serious views of reality; all are peo 
pled or charactered, however variously, to thematically discussable ends. The 
problem is therefore that of reading each book on its own terms, once we have 
got over the temptation to establish separate generic compartments encouraged 
by blurb-writers and their academic counterparts. And the need to read care 
fully and inductively extends, obviously, to those who cope with Robbe-Grillet 
and Spark. 
The reason for including Robbe-Grillet in this discussion is his arguing "for a 
new novel," intrinsically unlike nineteenth-century psychological realism. Then in 
his practice?say, in La Maison de Rendez-vous?he demonstrates what he means 
by his new prose fiction, his phenomenological art. He gives us a sharply visual 
ized set of happenings or detailed descriptions of what appear to be places and 
characters; he refuses to give us answers to fairly standard questions aroused by 
habits drilled into readers of nineteenth-century fiction. That is, he frustrates ef 
forts to find out who is (are) narrating; what audience(s) may be specifically 
addressed; where the book's happenings may be understood to have occurred; 
when, in relation to what seem like events, the narrative is being delivered; 
whether this or that speaker is recording history, or dreaming, or remembering 
interiorly, or supposing what might be or have been, as either history or litera 
ture; and how the items narrated may be related to one another chronologically, 
causally, "significantiy," psychologically, morally, socially or otherwise adverb 
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ially. Here is a whole lot of stuff, Robbe-Grillet seems to be saying, which may 
be thought of as happening inside and/or outside the mind(s) of one or more 
thinker-speakers, and all I've done is arrange it in precisely etched word-patterns 
out of which you readers will make whatever you like. But don't lay your mean 
ings to anything I've imposed upon you. I invite you to view my etchings; you 
make of them what you can or will or must. Psychology is dead; long seem to 
Uve phenomenology. 
This effort to succeed where Zola failed makes for remarkable differences from 
Dickens or Conrad, but it does not make for fundamental differences, since even 
in Robbe-Grillet we find such typical novelistic traits as incident, setting, prose 
narration, and even point of view and characterization of a specially incipient 
sort. Unreliability of narration, character, sequential occurrence, motivation, out 
come does not preclude narrative seriousness, adroitness of depiction, masterful 
illusion-making, and clarity of the work's direction and purport. The phenomen 
ologist's illusions may be created for ends different from those of the classical 
psychological novelist, but they are in fact illusions rendered in prose, and thus 
may well be called novels in the teeth of his own reiterations that "novel" means 
only psychological realism. Robbe-Grillet's prose illusions are delivered in aid of 
his sense of the way things are, just as Thackeray's were delivered. That Thack 
eray thought things more reliably discernible and generally agreed-upon, while 
Robbe-Grillet sees only things and no necessary agreement about meanings, does 
not affect their shared status as novelists, whatever their different manners may 
tell us about nineteenth- and twentieth-century notions of reality. Though Robbe 
Grillet disputes and defies Thackeray's brand of prose realistic convention, he is 
no less concerned with reality in the larger, non-literary sense of the word?con 
cerned, that is, to insist and demonstrate that such a reality as Thackeray's cannot 
be. Phenomenology's illusions of the real are not literary realism's. 
Where Robbe-Grillet works to divorce his fiction entirely from realism's con 
ventions, Muriel Spark only seems to want such a divorce. In a way, in fact, her 
novels are conventionally realistic. They move through separable phases of action 
so that eventually one may speak of beginning, middle end; of process and out 
come. They are filled with what we customarily describe as characters, a part of 
whose familiarity is that they develop and/or reveal more and more of their moti 
vation and particular psychology (though usually not all of these). Her novels 
are told by traditional third- and first-person narrators. The books operate on the 
assumption that we're out here banking on a fixed and reliable point of view in 
there to tell us how things were and how established characters saw things 
through to discussable conclusions. One may, in sum, speak of motivation, pro 
gress, development and outcome in these novels. 
To say no more, however, would be to fail Muriel Spark in two ways. On one 
hand, we would ignore the different effects of her and Robbe-Grillet's sharp de 
pictions of image, setting, character. On the other hand, we would slight the con 
siderable discrepancy between her and most realists. For if she is not Robbe 
Grillet, neither is she Arnold Bennett. What else, then, shall we say of her work? 
As might be expected, what remains to be said makes all the difference and 
122 
accounts for her uniqueness. For in her own way, Muriel Spark holds out against 
the conventions of an exclusive realism as strenuously as does Robbe-Grillet. 
Signs of her opposition are in fact prominent in all twelve of her novels, and are 
the reason for her finding disfavor in the eyes of many readers. This uniqueness 
may be spoken of as an attention paid to the other-worldly, as a penchant for 
fantasy, as a refusal to explain, or as any number of other indications that things 
are not quite normal in her books, where the reader's measure of normality is 
literary realism. And of course this deviation from the expected is more chastised 
than understood, accepted or applauded?predictably, since we have all been 
conditioned by two hundred years of literary realism. Nevertheless, such condi 
tioning is something out of which I should like to talk readers of Muriel Spark. 
Thus, when a typewriter appears to be heard operating in an adjoining room, 
as in The Comforters, we should: (1) assume that someone tangible and photo 
graphable is whacking away at the machine in question; (2) realize that Muriel 
Spark has assumed that we will make precisely that assumption; (3) not at once 
assume, when we catch nobody turning out the undeniably tangible copy, that 
the author or one of her characters is either crazy or trivially and poindessly fan 
tastic; (4) consider what, besides craziness or blind-alley mystification, might 
cause the novelist to build such fictional illusions; (5) realize that taking (4) 
seriously is not to betray realism or adult responsibility, but may in fact prod 
awake a dormant capacity to read such books as A Pilgrims Progress and The 
Scarlet Letter without inquiring guiltily, irrelevandy and self-defeatingly whether 
these books may be read and discussed as if Trollope had written them; and (6) 
"take" so instinctively to such unrealistic fictional incidents as to experience all 
five preceding insights habitually and automatically, and to see them as properly 
applicable to the particular sort of illusion created by Muriel Spark. But how to 
reach the condition of ( 6 ) ? 
As I see these points, (6) will inevitably follow our coming to terms with the 
other five; and the first three will become happy habit when we can handle (4) 
and (5) convincingly?as I should like now to try doing. If, as (4) asks, we de 
cline to throw away The Comforters and if we try instead to find out what we 
discern by proceeding patiendy, I think we conclude that realistic and non 
realistic traits in this book, whether or not they seem to contradict each other, at 
least co-exist. If that co-existence spurs us to ask what might be the point, the 
answer is likely to be reader confusion or unfamiliarity?which may be admitted 
to have its own interest. And, if we then move to (5), we may well see that 
whatever the effect of such a blending or perhaps clashing of styles, moral con 
cern need hardly be absent from Muriel Spark's practice. 
Thus far on the rather vaguely abstract and speculative level. In fact what we 
are asked to accept in reading The Comforters is that literary realism is important 
and necessary but limited; that for the awarenesses that Muriel Spark wants to 
convey, she requires realism to be both complemented and opposed; that Hamlet 
understands Horatio and much more, whatever the genuine merits of Horatio in 
arranging aftermaths and narrating external happenings. A bit less metaphorically, 
we are asked to entertain the notion that not all effects are adequately explained 
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by rationally attainable causes; that the sensibility of the author, which is notably 
like that of her author-character Caroline Rose, requires our vicarious identifica 
tion with its ability to entertain certain questions and phenomena which in our 
realistic reading habits we would blush to approach seriously. In short, unless 
we allow ourselves the kind of novel Muriel Spark has given us, we limit our 
selves to the otherwise fine imaginative enterprise involved in handling literary 
realism. Surely such inhibition should not be cultivated. 
In practice, what the foregoing example and discussion amount to is an inti 
mation of what we are to make of, say, the telephone calls in Memento Mori, the 
particulars of religious conversion in The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie and The Girls 
of Slender Means, the destruction of "realistic" suspense by virtue of using a flash 
forward device in such novels as The Drivers Seat and Not to Disturb, and the 
use of the dead as main characters in The Hothouse by the East River. Clearly, 
the author upsets what we are conditioned to think we may expect in mystery 
stories, tales of ratiocination, accounts of psychological development arranged to 
explain changes in behavior if only we will attend to what Western psychological 
schooling has prepared us for. Always in Muriel Spark's work there is something 
not only unincorporated into realistic tradition, but paradoxically forced to co 
operate with that tradition. Details isolated in this paragraph all point to a con 
sistent authorial awareness that we must indeed use our imagination and intelli 
gence, and that the most important thing we learn thereby is the limits of reason. 
Thus, of course rationally conditioned persons want to find out who's calling 
(rather than allow themselves to attend to what the caller says), and will get the 
phone company to trace the call: all sensible effects have traceable connected 
causes, do they not? No, says Muriel Spark, they do not; or if they do have such 
causes they have other causes as well?and the combination of emphasis upon 
the limits of our knowledge and the possibility or even inevitability of more 
than one kind of cause is what makes these twelve novels. It should not be sur 
prising, then, once we have put aside Dreiserian assumptions, to find that a con 
viction of evil can be as overpowering as a conviction of good, and can therefore 
motivate 
religious conversion. Similarly, once we have discarded our assumption 
that stories housing servants, jaded masters, police, questionable accumulations of 
large sums of money, and violent deaths signify a single kind of mystery story, 
we are in a position to see that Muriel Spark is interested in presenting her 
awareness that what is mysterious may importandy extend beyond whodunnit 
for what motive to the sense that events are not only sequentially perpetrated 
and humanly motivated (or indeed humanly accidental), but also tunelessly or 
dained (or indeed even accomplis). And again, once imagination admits the pos 
sibility, whether solely metaphorical or also real, that eternity both exists and, as 
spiritual realm, includes or co-extends with the temporal, how can we be sur 
prised to find those whom we "realistically" call dead moving and otherwise act 
ing physically on terra firma? Should we then presume to ask why Muriel Spark 
wants to write this way, the answer, as when we implicidy exacted it of Thack 
eray and Robbe-Grillet, is that she wishes to make manifest her view of reality? 
not Thackeray's realism and not Robbe-Grillet's phenomenological conviction of 
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the real, but her own sense of the way in which Thackeray's realism combines 
with Christian belief to convey what is. 
Ill 
Realism, then, is merely the dominant and most familiar means of setting out 
one brand of illusion of what is real. Robbe-Grillet and Muriel Spark, while they 
share certain habits of literary realists, nonetheless operate on assumptions distinct 
from the realist's and from each other's for the most part. And here we may per 
haps return to our opening observations drawn from E. M. Forster, in order to 
round out this argument and end where we began. 
Forster's novel showed his awareness of what seemed the impossibility of re 
taining a classical rationalist's faith in the mind alone, but the novel showed also 
Matthew Arnold's inability to recapture a former religious belief. The way out of 
this famous bind would be for East and West to merge in the equanimity of Pro 
fessor Godbole. But of course this is exactly what the novel posits as impossible in 
this time and place, and the book ends in longing, hope and at most a glimmer of 
possibility in the liberal humanist Fielding's marriage to Stella, who is Mrs. 
Moore's other child and Adela Quested's disciple. But a glimmer is really all we 
get. Forster is a liberal Bloomsbury realist straining against his heritage and hon 
est?y shaping his book to suggest but not effect the surpassing of his own beliefs. 
In his novel, Mrs. Moore's idea of mystery is destroyed and not explainably re 
placed in the subsequent career of Miss Quested. Thus, while the reader knows 
Forster's desire to provide a credible or viable substitute for that sense of mys 
tery, he knows also that Fielding and Aziz, as rationalists, persist in thinking 
"mystery" and "muddle" interchangeable terms of equal meaninglessness, and h? 
knows finally that Godbole is inscrutably unique. Moreover, if we should wish to 
argue that Forster's very book, in demonstrating his ability to imagine such a 
spectrum of human possibilities (a spectrum ranging from Ronnie's harrumphing 
beef eating assurance to Fielding and Aziz's rationalism to Mrs. Moore to Adela 
Quested to extra-rational hope whispered in Fielding and Stella to Ralph's help 
less openness to Godbole's paradoxically sealed transcendence)?if we suppose 
that such moral-aesthetic range is itself a substitute for the vanished sense of 
mystery, I would reply that while such art contributes to the glimmer of hope, it 
is nevertheless focused on 
characterizing, however brilliantiy, assortments and 
degrees of opaqueness and isolation. The fineness of Forster's art is not itself a 
bridge or a passage, but is rather the poignant sign of what is vastiy wanting. 
(Interestingly, those who produced the BBC television play entided A Passage 
to India presumably found the whole spiritual issue so fundamentally undrama 
tizable, at least today, that they focused upon, and ended with, the courtroom 
showdown. Such Procrustean obeisance to "realism," however understandable, 
may abet our discussion of why Muriel Spark has trouble communicating. ) 
A half-century later, Robbe-Grillet has simply abandoned any hope of achiev 
ing the sort of merger which Forster sought. Jealousy, La Maison de Rendez-vous 
and his other books all take for granted the premise of Sartre's Existentialism, 
that of course what is is absurd and without the possibility of yielding what used 
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to be called 
"meaning." In the inevitably resulting total subjectivity, then, we 
achieve Zola's dream of total objectivity. No literary art, consequentiy, makes any 
sense except that art which assumes moral and psychic isolation beyond the re 
cording or reciting (painstakingly, to be sure) of stuff, things, phenomena "hu 
man" or other. Robbe-Grillet's art, like Sartre's philosophy, is rooted in despair, 
whatever optimism may paradoxically emerge for either man from that origin. 
Meaning is a foolish notion, a non-notion, but in any event cannot signify be 
yond the individual sensibility. To become Godbole would be meaningless even if 
it were possible. Why play games to separate "mystery" from "muddle" (or in 
deed to combine the two) when all is a chaos of eaches, non-meaning impeccably 
languaged? 
In such a context, Muriel Spark has a difficult task, we may say. In her books 
it is evident that 
"mystery" and "muddle" do not coalesce in a universal absurd 
ity. It is also evident that these terms do not coalesce in sloppy synonymy, as for 
the classic old-fashioned rationalist, to signify what the mind has not yet signifi 
cant?y discovered, but what man will eventually know and explain because after 
all whatever 
"really" is can be mind-handled. Rather, Muriel Spark's work im 
plicidy distinguishes between these terms, so that "muddle" may be understood 
to mean such things as are available to the mind and therefore potentially com 
prehensible by reason, but which are at present still unclear. "Mystery," on the 
other hand, may be taken to embrace that whole area of experience and possi 
bility of which one may have intuitive awareness, and in which one must there 
fore believe, but which is no more fathomable by mind, the rational faculty, than 
the ability to write music belongs to bulldozers. 
Operating out of such assumptions, Muriel Spark therefore uses conventions of 
literary realism to build our expectations and to involve us therein before she 
overturns these expectations by including realism's moves within a larger reality 
(much as Hamlet's view does not reject, but accommodates and includes, Hora 
tio's). Being thus true to her vision means of course parting company with the 
Fieldings, whose liberal Western realism, for all its humanistic tolerance, sup 
poses her to be making a distinction without a difference and indulging in wish 
ful thinking; and it means alienating the Robbe-Grillets as well, who will have 
rejected not only the distinction but Fielding and Aziz's realism too. In short, 
Muriel Spark sets herself the chore of making illusorily real the double vision of 
Adela Quested and the potentiality of simultaneous vision as embodied in the 
attitude of Professor Godbole. 
Reading Forster, Robbe-Grillet and Muriel Spark together in this way has per 
haps demonstrated my conviction of how they bear upon one another as well as 
how they disagree in their ideas of the real. The problem is that of discovering 
various uniquenesses and probably of suspending various disbeliefs. In day-to-day 
reading, teaching, criticizing, this problem in our time remains one of distinguish 
ing between the conventions of literary realism and what may be seen as reality.* 
* I am grateful to the University of Oregons Office of Scientific and Scholarly Re 
search for the Summer Research Award which assisted me in the writing of this paper. 
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